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Abstract
We examine the relationships among religious governance, especially Islamic 
governance quality (IGQ), national governance quality (NGQ), and risk 
management and disclosure practices (RDPs), and consequently ascertain 
whether NGQ has a moderating influence on the IGQ–RDPs nexus. Using 
one of the largest data sets relating to Islamic banks from 10 Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) countries from 2006 to 2013, our findings are 
threefold. First, we find that RDPs are higher in banks with higher IGQ. 
Second, we find that RDPs are higher in banks from countries with higher 
NGQ. Finally, we find that NGQ has a moderating effect on the IGQ–RDPs 
nexus. Our findings are robust to alternative RDP measures and estimation 
techniques. These results imply that the quality of disclosure depends on the 
nature of the macro-social-level factors, such as religion that have remained 
largely unexplored in business and society research, and, therefore, have 
important implications for policy makers.
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In this article, we seek to make a number of new contributions to the extant 
literature by (a) examining the extent to which national and religious gover-
nance, especially Islamic governance quality influences the level of risk dis-
closure in Islamic banks; and (b) consequently, ascertaining whether the link 
between Islamic governance quality (IGQ) and bank risk management and 
disclosure practices (RDPs) is moderated by national governance quality 
(NGQ).1
Meanwhile, RDPs are a significant part of a bank’s long-term financial 
sustainability and annual reporting. They often include managerial clarifica-
tions and commentaries about a bank’s up-to-date state regarding uncertainty 
and future predictions (Ntim, Lindop, & Thomas, 2013). In fact, regulators 
and stakeholders have been concerned with RDPs in recent years, especially 
following the 2007-2008 global banking crisis (Abedifar, Molyneux, & 
Tarazi, 2013; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision [BCBS], 2015). This notwithstanding, the role of macro-social-
level factors, such as religion and national governance in driving business 
decisions and outcomes, such as RDPs in distinct religious, cultural, and 
business contexts remains largely unexplored (Du, Jian, Zeng, & Du, 2014; 
Ullah, Jamali, & Harwood, 2014). Specifically, prior studies investigating the 
relationships among IGQ, NGQ, and RDPs are rare (Barakat & Hussainey, 
2013; Ntim et al., 2013). Similarly, and to the best of our knowledge, there is 
no extant study examining how NGQ might probably affect the IGQ–RDPs 
nexus. A number of reasons have often been cited for the lack of empirical 
research exploring the effect of religion, in particular, in corporate decision 
making and outcomes, including religion being inherently divisive, sensitive, 
and inconsistent with the principles underlying business (Tracey, 2012). 
Nevertheless, another strand of research suggests that religion can be influen-
tial in business decisions and operations (Chan-Serafin, Brief, & George, 
2013). In this case, previous research has, for example, linked religiosity-
based management to the extent of social and environmental disclosures 
(Al-Bassam & Ntim, 2017; Farook, Kabir Hassan, & Lanis, 2011; Haniffa & 
Hudaib, 2007; Losoncz, 2011; Rahman & Bukair, 2013), risk-taking (Chircop, 
Fabrizi, Ipino, & Parbonetti, 2017), earnings management (Elghuweel, Ntim, 
Opong, & Avison, 2017), and financial reporting irregularities (McGuire, 
Omer, & Sharp, 2012). The current study, therefore, seeks to address this 
lacuna within the extant literature by examining the links among IGQ, NGQ, 
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and RDPs. In addition, we explore why and how NGQ may have a moderat-
ing influence on the IGQ–RDPs nexus within Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) Islamic banks.
RDPs have witnessed substantial developments and interests in recent 
years (Abdallah, Hassan, & McClelland, 2015). In this case, the prior litera-
ture suggests that Islamic banks may commit to increased RDPs for two main 
theoretical reasons: (a) efficiency/instrumental and (b) legitimation/moral 
ones. First, and from the efficiency perspective of neo-institutional theory, 
institutional pressures often originating from coercive, mimetic, and norma-
tive forces can compel corporations to commit to standards and regulations 
that can enhance internal processes, improve efficiency, and thereby gain 
competitive advantages. In this case, engaging in transparent RDPs may 
improve economic performance by reducing information asymmetry between 
management and shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ntim et al., 2013; 
Safieddine, 2009). Similarly, committing to increased RDPs may send posi-
tive signals to prospective investors about management’s willingness to 
engage in prudent risk management practices, and thereby offer access to 
cheaper capital (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011; Ntim et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, improved RDPs can enhance financial performance and 
improve economic efficiency by offering Islamic banks’ access to critical 
resources, such as Islamic bonds (“Sukuk”) and contracts (Al-Bassam, Ntim, 
Opong, & Downs, 2017; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).
Second, the legitimation/moral view of neo-institutional theory predicts 
that coercive, mimetic, and/or normative institutional forces can compel 
Islamic banks to conform to expected social behavior. This is because con-
forming to such expected social behavior can be a strategic approach toward 
enhancing Islamic banks’ legitimacy and justifying their right to exist 
(Al-Bassam et al., 2017; Ntim et al., 2013). Thus, compliance with good 
RDPs, in the form of increased risk disclosures, can facilitate congruence of 
the goals and norms of Islamic banks with those of the broader society, and 
thereby improve organizational legitimacy. Similarly, the need to maintain 
good relationships with various bank stakeholders (Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, 
& Ganapathi, 2007), and hence improving organizational legitimacy, can 
serve as a motivation for Islamic banks to engage in, or mimic, accepted 
social behavior (Al-Bassam et al., 2017). Hence, engagement in RDPs by 
Islamic banks can strategically enhance their legitimacy by helping to gain 
the support of powerful stakeholders, such as governments, employees, 
shareholders, depositors, and investors (Freeman, 1984; Freeman & Reed, 
1983). Consequently, and in consideration of the apparent complex nature of 
the relationship among RDPs, Islamic governance, and national governance 
in specific settings, such as MENA (Al-Bassam & Ntim, 2017; Elghuweel 
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et al., 2017), there have been increasing calls for research that can explore the 
determinants of RDPs from theoretical perspectives that have the capacity to 
capture both efficiency and legitimation motives underlying corporate 
engagement in RDPs (Judge, Douglas, & Kutan, 2008; Judge, Li, & Pinsker, 
2010; Ntim et al., 2013).
Noticeably, the extant research has examined a wide range of motivations 
and antecedents of RDPs (e.g., Abdallah et al., 2015; Barakat & Hussainey, 
2013; Dobler, Lajili, & Zéghal, 2011; Ntim et al., 2013). However, existing 
research seems to suffer from a number of weaknesses. Despite the signifi-
cance of increased RDPs and the associated substantial accounting standards 
(e.g., International Financial Reporting Standards [IFRS] 7 and 9, International 
Accounting Standards 32 and 39), and corporate governance reforms world-
wide (Abdulrahman, Abdou, Ntim, & Elamer, 2017; Al-Bassam et al., 2017; 
Elmagrhi, Ntim, & Wang, 2016), existing RDPs research is largely focused 
on examining the influence of either firm-level characteristics (Dobler et al., 
2011; Linsley & Shrives, 2006) or internal corporate governance mechanisms 
(Abraham & Cox, 2007; Ntim et al., 2013) on RDPs in nonfinancial firms in 
developed countries. By contrast, studies investigating why and how religion 
and other macro-social-level factors may influence the level of RDPs in 
Islamic banks are rare (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Ullah et al., 2014), espe-
cially in developing countries (Abdallah et al., 2015). Meanwhile, a number 
of studies indicate that macro-social-level institutional factors, such as 
national governance and religion can influence corporate decisions and out-
comes (Alon & Dwyer, 2014; Ernstberger & Grüning, 2013). In the case of 
IGQ and NGQ, for example, it has been argued from a neo-institutional theo-
retical perspective that they can help in determining how bank executives 
treat their shareholders, as well as make decisions, including those relating to 
voluntary disclosures (Essen, Engelen, & Carney, 2013), and thus, can argu-
ably ultimately affect RDPs directly. Also, and despite the growing sugges-
tions that NGQ may be an important driver of bank strategies, behavior, and 
valuation (Alon & Dwyer, 2014; Ernstberger & Grüning, 2013; Essen et al., 
2013; Tunyi & Ntim, 2016), the extant research relating to the impact of 
NGQ on disclosure quality (e.g., RDPs) has received little attention (Alon & 
Dwyer, 2014; Cahan, De Villiers, Jeter, Naiker, & Van Staden, 2015; Schiehll, 
Ahmadjian, & Filatotchev, 2014).
Furthermore, and notwithstanding the lack of evidence relating to the 
IGQ–RDPs nexus (Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, & Jackson, 2008; Barakat 
& Hussainey, 2013; Essen et al., 2013; Ntim et al., 2013), to the best of our 
knowledge, there is no extant research that has examined whether NGQ can 
moderate the IGQ–RDPs relationship. Meanwhile, Islamic banks in the 
MENA region provide a unique context for exploring RDPs. Islamic banks 
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operate on the basis of Islamic religious business principles, values, and laws 
that are drawn from Shariah (Islamic law), and, thus, arguably offer an inter-
esting context to assess the extent to which religion (IGQ) and other macro-
social-level factors, such as NGQ may drive RDPs. In particular, the 
distinctiveness of Islamic banking/finance forms can create unique chal-
lenges regarding disclosure and society. For example, it has been suggested 
that some specific Islamic banking/finance forms, such as “mudarabah” 
(profit-sharing), “murabaha” (cost plus), “musharakah” (joint venture), 
“bai-muajjal” (deferred payment sale), “ijarah” (leasing), and “istisna” (pro-
cessing and manufacturing contracts) may not only be more prune to conven-
tional agency conflicts, such as adverse selection and moral hazard problems, 
but also can exacerbate nontraditional agency problems by increasing oppor-
tunities for managerial expropriation of bank assets (Al-Bassam & Ntim, 
2017; Elghuweel et al., 2017; Safieddine, 2009). Furthermore, MENA coun-
tries have observably pursued economic, corporate governance, accounting 
standards, and regulatory reforms (Amico, 2014). These reforms have in the 
main created an enabling economic and corporate environment within which 
Islamic banks can maintain successful operations. However, and arguably, 
the relatively poor NGQ in a majority of MENA countries may affect the 
trustworthiness of Islamic banks.
Hence, this study seeks to make a number of new contributions to the 
extant literature by examining the relationship among IGQ, NGQ, and RDPs 
within such a distinct environment. First, and drawing insights from a neo-
institutional perspective, we offer first-time evidence on the impact of IGQ 
on Islamic banks’ RDPs. Recent studies suggest that Shariah boards play an 
important role in monitoring Islamic bank’s financial reporting quality 
(Al-Bassam & Ntim, 2017; Farook et al., 2011; Safieddine, 2009). We extend 
this nascent research by providing evidence that Islamic governance can 
serve as an additional governance layer with capacity to closely monitor and 
scrutinize managerial decisions, including those relating to disclosures. We 
argue that by highlighting the monitoring, performance, and value maximiz-
ing roles of Islamic governance within Islamic banks, our finding may help 
inform the decisions of the various stakeholders of Islamic banks, such as 
employees, depositors, investors, government, and regulators. Second, and to 
the best of our knowledge, our study offers first-time evidence on the effect 
of NGQ on RDPs. This result may potentially help investors and regulators 
to better understand and/or evaluate the channels (e.g., the institutional and 
regulatory setting) through which macro-social-level factors, such as religion 
and national governance affect disclosure quality, transparency, and account-
ability within Islamic banks. Finally, previous research indicates that the rela-
tion between governance quality and disclosure varies according to the type 
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of business, disclosure, and contexts (Abedifar et al., 2013; Barakat & 
Hussainey, 2013; Essen et al., 2013; Ntim et al., 2013). We extend this litera-
ture by providing first-time evidence that shows that NGQ has a moderating 
effect on the relationship between IGQ and RDPs.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. The next section outlines the 
theoretical framework. The following sections review the extant empirical 
literature and develop research hypotheses, outline the research design, and 
discuss the empirical results, whereas the final section presents concluding 
remarks, and discusses implications and recommendations for future research.
Theoretical Framework
The variations in RDPs could be explained through a generalized neo-institu-
tional lens because a generally accepted theory that links RDPs and gover-
nance is still elusive (Christopher, 2010; Ntim et al., 2013; Zattoni & Van 
Ees, 2012). Thus, we employ a generalized neo-institutional perspective as a 
direct response to the latest calls for innovative alternative theoretical 
approaches to the ubiquitous agency theory for studying the link between 
IGQ and RDPs (Abraham & Shrives, 2014; Christopher, 2010; Dobler et al., 
2011). One reason is that no single theoretical framework may be able to 
offer a complete understanding of how Islamic and national governance 
mechanisms may affect RDPs on their own. By contrast, insights from a gen-
eralized neo-institutional perspective may offer unique insights toward inter-
preting and explaining RDPs within distinctive regulatory and institutional 
contexts, such as MENA. Also, a neo-institutional perspective may facilitate 
the examination of the potential interactions among IGQ, NGQ, and RDPs 
(Ntim et al., 2013; Zattoni & Van Ees, 2012; Haque & Ntim, 2017).
Briefly, a generalized neo-institutional theory incorporates both effi-
ciency/instrumental perspective, and legitimation/moral view of Islamic 
banks operating in an institutional environment rather than examining the 
incidence of particular institutional isomorphisms directly (e.g., coercive, 
mimetic, and/or normative institutional pressures). In this case, and on one 
hand, efficiency/instrumental perspective of the generalized neo-institu-
tional theory suggests that effective mechanisms relating to bank- and 
national-level governance quality may lead to more transparent risk disclo-
sures. Consequently, increased risk disclosure can mitigate agency conflicts 
and reduce the information asymmetry between management and share-
holders (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Safieddine, 
2009). Efficiency/instrumental motive further suggests that economic 
actors principally tend to maximize their self-interests by competing for 
critical resources.
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On the other hand, sociology theorists consider institutions to be beyond 
not only delivering economic efficiency but also as social institutions with 
some symbolic value (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Hence, the sociological neo-
institutionalism theorists suggest that individuals and firms not only compete 
for critical resources but also endeavor to gain social acceptance (“organisa-
tional legitimacy”; Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008). In this respect, legitimation is 
driven by the different values and ethics of economic actors, which may 
direct an Islamic bank, for example, to adopt some practices with no instant 
or clear economic benefits (e.g., interest-free loans or “Qard Hassan”).
Specifically, Scott (2001) theorized that neo-institutional framework con-
tains three levels of analysis: social (country) institutions, governance arrange-
ments, and firms as economic actors. Social (country) level institutions 
provide a formal and informal platforms that provide legitimate models and 
standards of acceptable social behavior (Judge et al., 2008; Judge et al., 2010). 
In this case, social (country) level institutions may interact to shape, facilitate, 
and/or limit the diffusion and/or imposition of structures and actions at lower 
levels. Thus, it suggests that Islamic banks are more likely to seek to conform 
to societal norms and expectations, and as such, may engage in increased risk 
disclosures, as a way of conforming to such expectations (Ntim et al., 2013; 
Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). These pressures tend to arise from Islamic banks’ 
external and internal forces, and may lead to institutionalization and organiza-
tions’ isomorphic behavior (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Ntim et al., 2013). 
Hence, a key principal assumption within a generalized neo-institutional the-
ory’s perspective is that the firms are not only seeking “legitimacy” and social 
acceptance but also competing for critical resources (“efficiency”).
A generalized neo-institutional theory has rarely been employed at the 
organizational level of analysis relating to Islamic governance–RDPs nexus, 
and this is principally relevant with respect to the rapid global growth of 
Islamic banking over the past decades. Debatably, there is opportunity to 
extend our understanding of the institutional antecedents and justifications of 
RDPs beyond Islamic banks. Hence, complying with Basel Accords and 
IFRS through increased RDPs can enhance the legitimacy of bank generally. 
Similarly, voluntarily engaging in RDPs can help Islamic banks to gain orga-
nizational legitimacy by fairly balancing the diverse, and often conflicting, 
demands of their different influential stakeholders, such as investors, share-
holders, governments, and depositors (Freeman, 1984; Freeman & Reed, 
1983). Furthermore, increased commitment to RDPs can send a credible sig-
nal to current and prospective investors of the quality of a bank’s governance 
structures, and, by extension, its positive current and future prospects 
(Connelly et al., 2011; Ntim et al., 2013). This can enhance economic effi-
ciency by granting access to critical resources, such as cheaper capital.
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This study, therefore, seeks to enhance these neo-institutional motives by 
drawing insights from all of them together (i.e., efficiency and legitimacy 
perspectives) in examining and understanding the associations among Islamic 
governance, national governance, and bank risk disclosures. To add further 
theoretical nuance to our neo-institutional lens, we cogitate how NGQ and 
further effects, such as ethical and religious values of the MENA region (i.e., 
IGQ) may influence RDPs, as presented in Figure 1.
Related Literature and Research Hypotheses 
Development
Most prior literature on RDPs focuses on firm-specific factors (e.g., Dobler 
et al., 2011; Ntim, Soobaroyen, & Broad, 2017). However, the focus has 
recently shifted from firm-specific factors to firm’s internal corporate gover-
nance mechanisms following unprecedented malfeasance and bank failures 
(Ntim et al., 2013). Conversely, there is no consistent evidence on the rela-
tionship between corporate governance mechanisms and disclosure quality in 
banks (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Ntim et al., 2013). Moreover, the role of reli-
gion and other macro-social-level factors in influencing RDPs has not been 
explored. Specifically, most prior RDPs studies rely on single governance-
level analytical approach, while often being inattentive to the potential influ-
ence of religion and national governance-level factors (Barakat & Hussainey, 
2013). Consequently, this study seeks to examine the impact of IGQ on the 
level of RDPs. In addition, this study investigates the effect of NGQ on the 
Figure 1. Proposed empirical model.
Note. The graph describes the structural relations between IGQ, NGQ, and RDPs, either 
directly (solid lines) or via moderating effect of NGQ (dotted lines). IGQ = Islamic 
governance quality; NGQ = national governance quality; RDPs = risk management and 
disclosure practices.
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level of RDPs. Finally, it explores why and how NGQ may have a moderating 
influence on the IGQ–RDPs nexus in MENA Islamic banks.
Islamic Governance Quality and Risk Management and 
Disclosure Practices
It can be argued that Islamic banks’ activities are likely to be consistent with 
the shareholders, stakeholders, and society’ expectations because of their 
explicit incorporation of Islamic values and laws (Shariah) into their opera-
tions (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009; Elghuweel et al., 2017). These include the prohi-
bition of interest charges (“riba” or “usury”) and Shariah supervisory boards 
in Islamic banks that are responsible for assessing whether Islamic banks’ 
transactions meet the requirements of Islamic law and values.2 Thus, it can be 
conjectured that Islamic governance may play an important role in Islamic 
banks’ decision making, including those relating to RDPs. For example, pru-
dential supervision and principles regarding Islamic governance may place a 
better emphasis on committing to more transparent disclosure practices for a 
number of theoretical considerations (Al-Bassam & Ntim, 2017; Farook 
et al., 2011). From an efficiency/instrumental perspective (Aguilera et al., 
2007; Chen & Roberts, 2010), neo-institutional theory suggests that Islamic 
governance is likely to convey additional monitoring requirements to Islamic 
banks due to further rules, experience, and knowledge needed to be Shariah 
compliant (Al-Bassam & Ntim, 2017; Elghuweel et al., 2017). In particular, 
Islamic governance rooted in Islamic religious values and principles may 
offer opportunities to engage in greater RDPs through certifying whether 
Islamic banks have complied with Shariah and related risks, and thus, miti-
gating the level of information asymmetry between managers and Islamic 
banks’ stakeholders (Al-Bassam & Ntim, 2017; Farook et al., 2011; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Safieddine, 2009). The legitimation/moral view of neo-
institutional theory predicts that Islamic governance may offer incentives to 
engage in greater RDPs to enhance their legitimacy within the broader soci-
ety (Al-Bassam et al., 2017; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007; Ntim et al., 2013; 
Pittroff, 2014). Furthermore, Islamic governance may offer incentives to 
engage in greater RDPs, especially practices linked to complying with 
Shariah and related risks due to coercive and societal pressures, arising from 
MENA Islamic banks’ external settings, as well as institutional pressures 
within the banks (Chandler & Hwang, 2015; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013).
A number of current qualitative studies have explored the nature of Islamic 
governance and ethics in Islamic banks (Ullah et al., 2014). For example, 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2007) examined the ethical identity of Islamic banks 
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using annual reports data from seven Islamic banks in four Gulf countries 
from 2002 to 2004. They found that Islamic banks disclose further informa-
tion relating to Shariah supervisory boards as a way of creating ethically and 
socially responsible identity for Islamic banks. Ullah and colleagues (2014) 
have also reported similar findings for Shariah departments relating to 
socially responsible investments. Furthermore, Safieddine (2009) explored 
corporate governance practices using a survey of 43 questions from 40 
Islamic banks in five Gulf countries. The results of Safieddine indicate that 
Islamic banks have well-established Shariah supervisory boards, which oper-
ate as good proxies for Islamic governance based on an evaluation of their 
independence, structure, education, and power.
Prior quantitative studies have also found a strong evidence supporting the 
view that the quality of Islamic governance has a positive impact on social 
responsibility disclosures within Islamic banks (Farook et al., 2011; Haniffa 
& Hudaib, 2007; Rahman & Bukair, 2013). For instance, using data from 47 
Islamic banks in 14 countries, Farook and colleagues (2011) found that 
Islamic governance quality, including the presence of a Shariah supervisory 
board has a positive impact on the level of social responsibility disclosures. 
Similarly, prior literature has examined the relationship between Islamic gov-
ernance quality and disclosure quality. For instance, using data from 75 firms 
listed on the Saudi market from 2004 to 2010, Al-Bassam and Ntim (2017) 
found that Shariah supervisory board characteristics have a positive effect on 
the level of voluntary corporate governance disclosure. Similarly, and using 
a sample of 116 Omani firms from 2001 to 2011, Elghuweel and colleagues 
(2017) reported that IGQ has a negative effect on earnings management. 
Notably, to the best of our knowledge, no prior study has examined the impact 
of IGQ on RDPs to date, thus providing genuine opportunity to make a new 
contribution to the literature by examining this association. Accordingly, we 
hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1: The level of IGQ is positively related to the level of RDPs.
National Governance Quality and RDPs
Effective national governance may place further emphasis on RDPs (Barakat 
& Hussainey, 2013; Essen et al., 2013; Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 
2011). Efficiency/instrumental perspective of neo-institutional theory sug-
gests that banks in countries with improved national governance quality may 
provide additional monitoring level that can mitigate information asymme-
tries, and hence serve as a motivation to engage in greater RDPs (Aguilera 
et al., 2008; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Beltratti & Stulz, 2012). Similarly, 
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the legitimation/moral view of neo-institutional theory suggests that NGQ 
may offer Islamic banks incentives to engage in greater RDPs to gain the 
legitimacy to exist and carry out their operations from the broader society 
(Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007; Ntim et al., 2013; 
Pittroff, 2014). Also, NGQ may offer incentives to engage in greater RDPs 
due to coercive and societal pressures arising from banks’ external settings, 
such as government, professional, and regulatory bodies (Aguilera et al., 
2008; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Chandler & Hwang, 2015; DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). Finally, effective national gover-
nance may offer motivations and pressures to engage in greater RDPs to 
offer Islamic banks’ access to required resources, such as Sukuk (Alon & 
Dwyer, 2014; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Ntim et al., 2013; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 2003).
National governance structures are designed and employed to address 
agency problems (Aguilera, 2005; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & 
Vishny, 2000). They consist of formal constraints (e.g., regulations and laws, 
economic and political regulations and procedures, and other clear restric-
tions on bank behavior), and informal rules containing unwritten, but rela-
tively important, social norms, conventions, codes of ethics, and values 
(Kaufmann et al., 2011; Schiehll et al., 2014; Yoshikawa, Zhu, & Wang, 
2014). Thus, national governance structures can serve as motivation for eco-
nomic actors to comply with laws and regulations. Prior research suggests 
that national governance structures can protect stockholders from being 
expropriated by the company’s managers, and safeguards minority share-
holder rights (Aslan & Kumar, 2014; La Porta et al., 2000; Schiehll et al., 
2014; Yoshikawa et al., 2014). Hence, rigorous national governance struc-
tures tend to demand mandatory information disclosure and regulate market 
intermediaries, thereby alleviating information asymmetries. Also, they place 
the board of directors and managers under larger pressure to implement their 
regulatory responsibility (Yoshikawa et al., 2014). Collectively, rigorous 
national governance structures can serve as a valuable external governance 
instrument to protect shareholders and influence accountability and disclo-
sure quality. Thus, banks’ incentive to offer higher RDPs tends to be higher 
in countries with strong national governance structures.
The findings of previous empirical studies largely suggest that NGQ may 
be an important driver of bank strategies, behavior, and valuation (Alon & 
Dwyer, 2014; Ernstberger & Grüning, 2013; Essen et al., 2013; Tunyi & 
Ntim, 2016). However, empirical evidence regarding the impact of NGQ on 
disclosure quality, including RDPs is almost nonexistent. For instance, using 
85 banks from 20 European countries, Barakat and Hussainey (2013) found 
that countries with stronger NGQ (i.e., the rule of law [ROL]) are associated 
12 Business & Society 00(0)
with an increase in the level of operational risk disclosures. However, using 
data from 71 nations, Alon and Dwyer (2014) found that countries with poor 
NGQ are more likely to adopt IFRS early in comparison with their counter-
parts with strong NGQ, with the aim of allowing them to gain access to criti-
cal resources, such as foreign direct investments. To the best of our knowledge, 
no prior study has examined the impact of NGQ on RDPs to date, and, there-
fore, this study offers genuine opportunities to contribute to the extant litera-
ture by examining the effect of NGQ on RDPs. Accordingly, we hypothesize 
the following:
Hypothesis 2: NGQ is positively related to the level of RDPs.
IGQ and RDPs: The Moderating Effect of NGQ
Inconsistent results about the sign and significance of the governance qual-
ity–RDPs nexus has triggered a number of studies to explore them further 
(Abraham & Shrives, 2014; Aguilera et al., 2008; Barakat & Hussainey, 
2013; Essen et al., 2013; Ntim et al., 2013; Zattoni & Van Ees, 2012). On one 
hand, a number of studies indicate that different methodological approaches 
can lead to inconsistent results (Al-Bassam et al., 2017; Barakat & Hussainey, 
2013; Ntim et al., 2013). For instance, endogeneity problems (Barakat & 
Hussainey, 2013; Ntim et al., 2013), time frame differences (Abraham & 
Cox, 2007; Ntim et al., 2013), and different risk disclosure measures (Ntim 
et al., 2013) can affect the research findings. On the other hand, others sug-
gest that the mixed results relating to the governance–RDPs nexus can be 
addressed by concentrating on how probable theory-driven variables moder-
ate such a relationship (Aguilera, 2005; Aguilera et al., 2008; Alon & Dwyer, 
2014; Cahan et al., 2015; Ernstberger & Grüning, 2013; Essen et al., 2013).
La Porta and colleagues (1997, 2000) suggested that NGQ (e.g., legal 
rules and enforcement quality) might enhance investor protection, as well as 
the efficiency of governance structures (e.g., corporate governance mecha-
nisms, external finance type, and, more important, disclosure quality). Hence, 
La Porta and colleagues (1997, 2000) suggested that NGQ may have a mod-
erating role on the existing agency problems. Thus, Islamic banks might be 
motivated by coercive, mimetic, and normative national pressures, particu-
larly for those operating in strongly governed countries to engage in increased 
RDPs with the purpose of signaling their good performance and bright future 
prospects to their current and future stakeholders, such as employees, inves-
tors, and depositors.
Empirically, Ernstberger and Grüning (2013) reported that NGQ has a 
complementary or substitutive influence on the governance–disclosure nexus 
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using a sample of 1,044 European companies. Specifically, Ernstberger and 
Grüning’s (2013) results suggest that NGQ can serve as an alternative to 
firm-level governance quality in terms of its impact on corporate disclosure 
quality. Hence, we assume that the IGQ–RDPs relationship may be highly 
sensitive to the institutional environment, as characterized by the extent of 
NGQ. Accordingly, we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 3: NGQ moderates the relationship between IGQ and RDPs.
All the earlier hypothesized relations are shown in Figure 1.
Research Design
Sample Selection and Data Sources
Our sample is based on all listed Islamic and dual banks (ISBs) located in 10 
countries in the Arab MENA region, namely, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and UAE. We generate our sam-
ple based on the Bankscope database as shown in Table 1, from 2006 to 2013, 
covering pre-, during, and post-2007-2008 banking crisis period. In addition, 
the sample begins in 2006 because Basel II came into effect from mid-2005, 
as well as the fact that data before 2006 relating to the vast majority of our 
sample being unavailable. This results in a final sample of 64 banks over 8 
Table 1. Sample Selection Procedure.
Country Banks
Number of bank-year 
observations
PercentageIslamic Dual Overall
Bahrain 9 44 24 68 14.56
Egypt 6 13 20 33 8.01
Jordan 3 3 13 16 3.88
Kuwait 6 36 5 41 9.95
Lebanon 2 0 16 16 3.88
Oman 4 0 5 5 1.21
Qatar 8 24 28 52 12.62
Saudi Arabia 11 21 63 84 20.39
Syria 1 6 0 6 0.24
UAE 14 32 72 104 25.24
Sum 64 179 246 425 100.00
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years from 2006 to 2013. This generated a total of 425 bank-year observa-
tions for our empirical analyses.
We collected the data from three different sources. First, we collected 
RDPs and governance variables from annual reports, which we obtained 
mainly from the Perfect Information database and the sampled Islamic banks’ 
websites, where available. Second, financial data were obtained from the 
Bankscope database and the Islmaic banks’ annual reports. Finally, national 
macroeconomic statistics and national governance quality (NGQ) data were 
obtained from the World Bank’s databases.
Definition of Variables
The study’s variables are categorized into four main types and Table 2 pres-
ents the full definitions of all the variables used in this study.
First, and to test Hypothesis 1 to Hypothesis 3, we employ RDPs scores, 
as the dependent variable, which seek to measure the level of RDPs.
We measured RDPs variable using risk management and disclosure prac-
tices index (RDPI) based on six broad subsections and total of 96 individual 
items drawn from several sources. Particularly, the individual items were 
drawn from the (a) Basel accords (I, II, and III), (b) International Accounting 
Standards (IAS 32 and 39, IFRS 7 and 9), and (c) other risk disclosure items 
that have been employed previously in closely related studies (Barakat & 
Hussainey, 2013; Ntim et al., 2013). Hence, the RDPI contains 96 items clas-
sified as follows: (a) bank financial RDPs, consisting of (i) credit, (ii) liquid-
ity, (iii) market, and (iv) capital RDPs; and (b) bank nonfinancial RDPs, 
consisting of (i) operational and (ii) strategic RDPs. The appendix displays 
the definitions and scoring procedure of all 96 items included in the RDPI.
We use RDPI measurement approach instead of other quantitative mea-
sures (e.g., word, sentence, paragraph, and page counts) because indices 
measurement approach employed has the ability to measure RDPs more pre-
cisely (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Ntim, 2016). More specifically, RDPI 
measurement approach has the capacity to capture the comparative weights 
of different risk categories. In addition, alternative quantitative measures, 
such as word, sentence, paragraph, and page counts, have been repeatedly 
criticized for the increased probability of capturing non-RDPs (Beattie, 
McInnes, & Fearnley, 2004; Ntim, 2016); and, there is no broad agreement 
with respect to a set of predefined words or sentences that can fully reflect 
RDPs in annual reports. As a result of these limitations, we employ the index 
approach in coding our RDPs. However, the index measurement approach is 
also often criticized for being inherently subjective (Marston & Shrives, 
1991). Therefore, to reduce subjectivity, we followed the following steps.
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Table 2. Summary of Definitions of Variables.
Variables Definitions and coding
Panel A: Dependent variable (RDPI)
 RDPI The total risk management and disclosure practices score (RDPI) is calculated based on 
the unweighted (weighted) risk management and disclosure practices index, and full 
scoring criteria are clarified in the appendix. Unweighted RDPI consisting of 96 items 
drawn from three major sources: (a) the Basel accords (I, II, and III), (b) International 
Accounting Standards (IAS 32 and 39, IFRS 7 and 9), and (c) past risk disclosure studies, 
covering three main types of risk: (a) financial risk disclosures, (b) operational risk 
disclosures (nonfinancial risk), (c) and strategic risk disclosures (nonfinancial risk). It 
takes a value of 1 if each of the 96 RDPI items is disclosed, 0 otherwise, scaled to a 
value between 0% and 100%.
For the weighted RDPI, each of the 96 items has a score ranging from 0 to 2 (i.e., 0 
if risk item is not disclosed; 1 if a risk item focuses on past, future, good, bad, and/
or qualitative information; and 2 if a risk item focuses on past, future, good, bad, 
qualitative, and/or quantitative information). This weighted scoring procedure can 
result in a total potential score of 192; scaled to a value between 0% and 100%.
Panel B: IGQ index
 IGQ The IGQ index consists of seven items with each taking a value of 1 if disclosed, 
otherwise 0 as follows; (a) 1 if an SSB exists, 0 otherwise; (b) 1 if SSB report is 
disclosed, 0 otherwise; (c) 1 if the SSB’s members are disclosed, 0 otherwise; (d) 1 if 
SSB’s number of annual meetings are disclosed, 0 otherwise; (e) 1 if a statement that 
the SSB’s members are independent from management is disclosed, 0 otherwise; (f) 
1 if the experience of the bank’s SSB’s members is disclosed, 0 otherwise; and (g) 1 
if the total fees or remuneration paid to the members of a bank’s SSB is disclosed, 0 
otherwise. This unweighted scoring procedure can result in a total potential score of 7, 
scaled to a value between 0% and 100%.
Panel C: NGQ
 NGQ NGQ for each bank-year is calculated as a composite measure for the overall NGQ six 
dimensions, which are (a) voice and accountability quality (VAQ), (b) political stability 
quality (PSQ), (c) government quality (GEQ), (d) regulatory quality (RQ), (e) rule of law 
quality (ROL), and (f) control of corruption quality (COC).
Panel D: Control variables
 BDSZ Board size for each bank-year is calculated based on number of board of directors.
 GNDI Board gender diversity for each bank-year is calculated based on number of female 
directors divided by the total number of board of directors.
 NEDs Board independence for each bank-year is calculated based on the nonexecutive 
directors divided by the total number of board of directors.
 LTAS Bank size for each bank-year is calculated based on natural log of the book value of total 
assets.
 ROA Performance for each bank-year is calculated based on return on assets (ROA), which is 
net income divided by total assets.
 LIQR Liquidity for each bank-year is calculated based on net loans divided by total assets.
 CSTR Operations efficiency for each bank-year is calculated based on cost divided by income.
 CAPR Bank’s capital adequacy for each bank-year is calculated based on capital divided by risk-
weighted assets.
 INFR Annual inflation for each bank-year is consumer price change (annual %).
 GDP GDP per capita for each bank-year is average income per individual (current US$).
Note. RDPI = risk management and disclosure practices index; IAS = International Accounting Standards; 
IFRS = International Financial Reporting Standards; IGQ = Islamic governance quality; SSB = Shariah 
supervisory board; NGQ = national governance quality.
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First, two independent coders coded a sample of 10 annual reports inde-
pendently and their results were compared. Evidently, no main variances 
occurred, with high agreement coefficient (.83), which is higher than the 
acceptable level in the social science (reliability threshold ranges from .70 to 
.80; Beattie et al., 2004; Krippendorff, 2004; Marston & Shrives, 1991). 
Second, and subsequently, a single coder (the main coder) completed the cod-
ing of the rest of the RDPI. Third, the main coder recoded a sample of five 
annual reports randomly, and the results were compared with his previous 
original coding results. Apparently, no significant variances occurred, with 
high agreement coefficient (.95). Finally, we use Cronbach’s alpha to assess 
the internal consistency of the RDPI. The Cronbach’s alpha was sufficiently 
high at 83.50%, noting that the cutoff level for Cronbach’s alpha is 70% 
(Elghuweel et al., 2017).
Second, and to test the first hypothesis, our independent variable is the 
Islamic governance quality index (IGQ). It covers seven IGQ best practices, 
including broad areas of Islamic governance and business principles. The 
detailed items are contained in Table 2. The IGQ seeks to measure the extent 
to which Islamic banks voluntarily and clearly incorporate Islamic gover-
nance and business principles into their operations, and subsequently, dis-
closed in their annual reports. We selected these provisions based on three 
criteria. First, we conducted extensive exploration of the previous research 
that explores governance from an Islamic viewpoint and sourced Islamic 
governance quality variables used in those studies (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009; 
Al-Bassam & Ntim, 2017; Elghuweel et al., 2017; Farook et al., 2011; 
Rahman & Bukair, 2013; Safieddine, 2009). Second, we sourced relevant 
Islamic governance provisions contained in the Accounting and Auditing 
Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) standard on inde-
pendence of Shariah supervisory board. Finally, we supplemented these with 
Islamic governance variables that were identified in a preliminary explora-
tion of a sample of the sampled banks’ annual reports.
Third, because several studies suggest that NGQ can affect the quality of 
disclosure (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Essen et al., 2013; Kaufmann et al., 
2011; Zattoni & Van Ees, 2012), we collected data on NGQ. This study 
employed the Worldwide Governance Indicators developed by the World Bank 
to measure national governance quality (NGQ). Kaufmann and colleagues 
(2011) identified six dimensions of NGQ: (a) voice and accountability quality 
(VAQ), (b) political stability quality (PSQ), (c) government effectiveness qual-
ity (GEQ), (d) regulatory quality (RQ), (e) ROL, and (f) control of corruption 
(COC). Correlation matrix in Table 3 shows that there are high intercorrelations 
among the six NGQ dimensions, which are consistent with the findings of prior 
studies (Alon & Dwyer, 2014). Therefore, and following prior research (Dikova 
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& Van Witteloostuijn, 2007; Tunyi & Ntim, 2016), we conducted a principal 
components analysis (PCA) to create a composite measure for the overall NGQ 
dimensions. Table 4 shows the PCA (eigenvectors) and diagnostics of NGQ 
dimensions. The overall Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO), which we use as a mea-
sure of sampling adequacy is .7029, which is higher than the recommended 
minimum PCA value of .50 (Tunyi & Ntim, 2016).
Finally, we included a wide range of bank-level governance mechanisms, 
bank-level characteristics, and country-level factors, as control variables. 
Table 3. Correlation Matrix of the NGQ’s Six Dimensions.
Variable VAQ PSQ GEQ RQ ROL COC
VAQ  
PSQ .3005  
GEQ .2839 .7928  
RQ .2423 .6025 .862  
ROL .2161 .8197 .7615 .7902  
COC .2899 .8731 .9379 .7849 .8349 1.00
Note. National governance quality (NGQ) variables are as follows: voice and accountability 
quality (VAQ), political stability quality (PSQ), government quality (GEQ), regulatory quality 
(RQ), rule of law quality (ROL), and control of corruption quality (COC). See Table 2 for the 
definitions of each variable.
Table 4. PCA (Eigenvectors) and Diagnostics of the NGQ’s Six Dimensions.
Variables Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 Comp5 Comp6 Unexplained KMO
VAQ 0.176 0.979 0.060 0.075 −0.035 −0.019 0 .8226
PSQ 0.428 −0.008 −0.659 −0.054 0.599 0.148 0 .7523
GEQ 0.455 −0.067 0.203 −0.530 0.018 −0.683 0 .6687
RQ 0.419 −0.111 0.699 0.178 0.393 0.369 0 .6309
ROL 0.435 −0.145 −0.130 0.755 −0.307 −0.329 0 .6658
COC 0.463 −0.063 −0.125 −0.329 −0.626 0.517 0 .7950
Eigenvalue 4.336 0.900 0.416 0.250 0.070 0.028 — —
Proportion 0.723 0.150 0.069 0.042 0.012 0.005 — —
KMO — — — — — — — .7029
Note. This table reports the six dimensions of national governance quality indicators (NGQ), PCA 
(eigenvectors); Comp refers to component. The six dimensions of national governance quality indicators 
(NGQ) are defined as follows: voice and accountability quality (VAQ), political stability quality (PSQ), 
government quality (GEQ), regulatory quality (RQ), rule of law quality (ROL), control of corruption quality 
(COC). Also Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure (KMO) is a measure of sampling adequacy. See Table 2 for the 
definitions of each variable. PCA = principal components analysis.
18 Business & Society 00(0)
These include (a) bank-level governance mechanisms, such as board size 
(BDSZ), board gender diversity (GNDI), and nonexecutive directors (NEDs); 
(b) bank-level characteristics, such as bank size (LTAS), performance (ROA), 
liquidity (LIQR), operations efficiency (CSTR), and capital adequacy ratio 
(CAPR); and (c) country-level variables, such as annual inflation (INFR), 
and annual GDP per capita (GDPC). We do not develop direct theoretical 
links between these variables and RDPI for brevity, but the findings of a 
number of prior studies suggest that they can influence the level of the RDPI 
(Abdallah et al., 2015; Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Farook et al., 2011; Ntim 
et al., 2013).
Model Specification
We use fixed-effects regression analysis (Ntim et al., 2013) to investigate the 
moderating effect of NGQ on the relationship between IGQ and RDPs in 
MENA Islamic banks. Therefore, our main regression model to be considered 
is identified as follows:
 RDPI IGQ NGQ CONTROLSit i it i it i it it it
i
= + + + + +
=
∑α β β β δ ε0
1
13
,  (1)
where RDPI is a proxy of risk management and disclosure practices level for 
bank i during year t. IGQ refers to Islamic governance quality (IGQ). NGQ 
refers to national governance quality. CONTROLS refers to (a) bank-level gov-
ernance mechanism, including board size (BDSZ), gender diversity (GNDI), 
and nonexecutive directors (NEDs); (b) bank-level characteristics, namely, 
bank size (LTAS), performance (ROA), liquidity (LIQR), operations efficiency 
(CSTR), and capital adequacy (CAPR); and (c) country-level control variables 
including, annual inflation (INFR), and annual GDP per capita (GDPC). δ is 
the bank-year–specific fixed effects, and ε is the white noise error term.
We present the empirical analyses, including the descriptive statistics, 
bivariate correlations, and multivariate regression analyses in the following 
sections.
Empirical Results and Discussion
Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Analyses
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for the main indices (i.e., the unweighted 
risk management and disclosure practices index—RDPI), the weighted risk 
management and disclosure practices index (W-RDPI), and national gover-
nance quality (NGQ) for the full data set, as well as for each of the eight 
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bank-years examined, respectively. On average, the distribution of the RDPI 
differs considerably, ranging from 1.04% (one out of 96 items disclosed) to 
87.50% (84 out of 96) with a mean of 60.49%. Also, Table 5 reports that the 
RDPI improved over time. For instance, the mean of the RDPI improved 
steadily from 37.36% in 2006 to 67.85% in 2013. The steady improvement in 
the RDPI suggests that the implementation of the Basel Accords (Basel I, II, 
and III), International Accounting Standards (IAS 32, 9; IFRS 7 and 9) and 
national corporate governance (CG) codes (e.g., Egypt, Oman, and Saudi CG 
codes) appear to have helped in improving the level of RDPs among MENA 
banks. This seems to reflect the importance that has been attached to RDPs 
and good national governance, particularly during and after, the 2007-2008 
credit crunch (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Essen et al., 2013; Ntim et al., 
2013). Similarly, the distribution of the W-RDPI depicts a similar pattern to 
the distribution of the RDPI. By contrast, the distribution of the NGQ fluctu-
ates substantially, ranging from −8.19 to 3.22 with the mean of 0.48. Also, 
Table 5 reports that NGQ has been fluctuating over time. Continuous 
Table 5. Summary Statistics for RDPI, W-RDPI, and NGQ.
All 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Panel A: Dependent variable: Unweighted RDPI (%)
 Mean 60.49 37.36 51.84 58.20 61.97 64.85 64.74 66.35 67.85
 Minimum 1.04 6.25 7.29 1.04 7.29 34.38 30.21 36.46 37.50
 Maximum 87.50 80.21 76.04 80.21 80.21 80.21 80.21 80.21 87.50
Panel B: Dependent variable: W-RDPI (%)
 Mean 43.27 23.42 36.45 41.89 44.38 46.85 47.03 48.12 49.13
 Minimum 1.04 3.65 3.65 1.04 3.65 23.44 23.44 26.04 31.77
 Maximum 70.31 55.21 55.21 56.77 60.42 60.42 60.42 60.42 70.31
Panel C: Independent variable: NGQ
 Mean 0.48 −0.13 0.09 0.20 0.25 0.09 −0.27 −0.14 −0.05
 Minimum −8.19 −3.71 −4.00 −4.80 −4.55 −4.66 −5.44 −7.59 −8.19
 Maximum 3.22 1.69 1.82 2.16 3.22 2.83 2.14 2.99 3.05
Note. The sample consists of all listed Islamic and dual banks covering 10 countries in the Arab 
MENA region, namely, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Syria, and UAE. The data are extracted from Perfect information Database, Banks’ Websites, 
Bankscope Database, and the World Bank Database for 8 years from 2006 to 2013 inclusive. 
The final number of bank-year observations is 179 bank-year observations for Islamic banks 
and 246 bank-year observations for dual banks. This table presents summary of descriptive 
statistics of compliance levels with unweighted risk management and disclosure practices 
index (RDPI) and weighted risk management and disclosure practices index (W-RDPI), in 
addition to national governance quality (NGQ) in the full sample and each year separately from 
2006 to 2013. See Table 2 for the definitions of each variable.
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fluctuations in NGQ reflect the nature of MENA context. In particular, MENA 
countries have experienced considerable political instability, especially in the 
form of the “Arab Spring,” as well as the impact of the 2007-2008 credit 
crunch in the MENA region (Beltratti & Stulz, 2012; Hasan & Dridi, 2010).
Table 6 shows summary statistics for all variables. Similar to the RDPI, all 
the independent and control variables distributions generally show wide-
spread variations. For instance, Islamic governance (ISQ) ranges from 0.00% 
to 100.00% with a mean of 35.43%. Also, board size (BDSZ) ranges from 
3.00 to 15.00 with a mean of 10 board members. These results are in line with 
previous related studies in the banking sector (e.g., Hasan & Dridi, 2010; 
Rosman, Wahab, & Zainol, 2014). Finally, the values of other variables 
Table 6. Summary Statistics of All Variables for All 425 Observations.
Variables Number Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Dependent variables
 RDPI (%) 425.00 60.49 15.43 1.04 87.50
 W-RDPI (%) 425.00 43.27 11.92 1.04 70.31
Independent variables
 IGQ (%) 425.00 35.43 26.71 0.00 100.00
 NGQ 425.00 0.48 2.08 −8.19 3.22
Bank-level control variables
 BDSZ 425.00 10.17 2.01 3.00 15.00
 GNDI (%) 425.00 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.23
 NEDs (%) 425.00 0.88 0.19 0.00 1.00
 LTAS 425.00 16.03 1.58 3.73 21.09
 ROA (%) 425.00 0.01 0.05 −0.52 0.24
 LIQR (%) 425.00 53.42 15.74 0.00 79.93
 CSTR (%) 425.00 41.04 38.29 11.91 284.00
 CAPR (%) 425.00 21.18 16.83 9.26 204.41
Country-level control variables
 INFR 425.00 4.70 4.12 −5.00 15.00
 GDPC 425.00 28,068.99 24,723.56 1,472.60 93,714.10
Note. The sample consists of all listed Islamic and dual banks covering 10 countries in the 
Arab MENA region, namely, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, and UAE. The data are extracted from Perfect information Database, Banks’ 
Websites, Bankscope Database, and the World Bank Database for 8 years from 2006 to 
2013 inclusive. The final number of bank-year observations is 179 bank-year observations for 
Islamic banks and 246 bank-year observations for dual banks. This table reports the mean, 
standard deviation, and values of the minimum and the maximum range for all variables. See 
Table 2 for the definitions of each variable. RDPI = risk management and disclosure practices 
index; W-RDPI = weighted risk management and disclosure practices index; IGQ = Islamic 
governance quality; NGQ = national governance quality.
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reported in Table 6 suggest widespread variations in our sample, hence 
decreasing the possibilities of any sample selection bias.
Table 7 reports the correlation matrix of Pearson’s parametric coefficients 
for all variables to test for multicollinearities relating to the regression analy-
sis. Evidently, low correlation coefficients among the variables presented in 
Table 7 indicate absence of any serious multicollinearity problems. In addi-
tion, Table 7 shows statistically significant correlation between the RDPI and 
the other variables. For instance, BDSZ, NEDs, IGQ, NGQ, LTAS, and LIQR 
are positively related to the RDPI, whereas CAPR and INFR are negatively 
associated with the RDPI.
Regression Analyses and Discussion
Table 8 reports the fixed-effects regression results of the relationship among 
national governance quality (NGQ), Islamic governance quality (IGQ), and 
risk disclosures (RDPs). The findings of Models 1, 2, and 3 indicate that IGQ 
and NGQ are important in explaining observable differences in RDPs as fol-
lows. First, we examine whether IGQ affect the level of RDPI. The coeffi-
cients of the IGQ in Models 2 and 3 of Table 8 are positive (t = 8.35, p < .001 
and t = 8.79, p < .001, respectively), thus providing empirical support for 
Hypothesis 1. Specifically, this offers new evidence, which suggests that bet-
ter governed Islamic banks are more transparent about their risk management 
and disclosure practices than their poorly governed counterparts. To the best 
of our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the impact of IGQ on the 
level of RDPs. This evidence is largely in line with previous studies that sug-
gest that Islamic governance can improve general voluntary disclosure quality 
(Al-Bassam & Ntim, 2017; Farook et al., 2011; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007). This 
evidence is also consistent with the expectations of our neo-institutional 
framework presented in Figure 1, which suggests that effective Islamic gover-
nance conveys additional monitoring and accountability requirements on 
Islamic banks, thereby encouraging them to engage in greater RDPs 
(Al-Bassam & Ntim, 2017; Elghuweel et al., 2017; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Similarly, enhanced RDPs, due to coercive, normative, and mimetic pressures 
can lead to higher levels of risk disclosures to gain legitimacy from the broader 
society, which can facilitate access to critical resources, such as finance 
(Chandler & Hwang, 2015; Connelly et al., 2011; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007; 
Pittroff, 2014). All together, the result reveals that religiosity (i.e., Islamic 
governance) can serve as a motivating force for managers to commit to greater 
levels of accountability and transparency through increased RDPs, and thereby 
improve both the efficiency and legitimacy of Islamic banks’ operations 
(Al-Bassam & Ntim, 2017; Farook et al., 2011; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007).
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Second, our results show that cross-sectional differences in the RDPI level 
can largely be explained by NGQ. Specifically, the coefficient of the NGQ in 
Models 2 and 3 of Table 8 is positive (t = 2.84, p < .005, and t = 6.46, p < .000, 
respectively), and thus providing empirical support for Hypothesis 2. In particu-
lar, this offers a new evidence to suggest that banks in better governed countries 
engage in greater RDPs compared with their poorly governed counterparts. To 
the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical evidence to examine the 
impact of NGQ on RDPs, although this finding offers further empirical support 
for the findings of prior studies that suggest that NGQ has a positive effect on 
general voluntary disclosures (Barakat & Hussainey, 2013; Cahan et al., 2015). 
This evidence is also consistent with the expectations of our neo-institutional 
theoretical perspective, which suggests that improved NGQ can provide addi-
tional layer of monitoring that can help mitigate the level of information asym-
metry, hence offering bank executives greater motivation to commit to increased 
risk disclosures. Collectively, the NGQ results in Tables 8 and 9 are consistent 
with the notion that NGQ has a positive effect on bank executives’ commitment 
to accountability and transparency in the form of increased RDPs.
Finally, to ascertain whether the IGQ–RDPI relationship can be moderated 
by NGQ (to test Hypothesis 3), we create interaction variables between the 
IGQ and NGQ variables (i.e., NGQ × IGQ) in Model 3 of Table 8.3 Our estima-
tion is based on the emerging theoretical and empirical evidence (Aguilera, 
2005; Aguilera et al., 2008; Alon & Dwyer, 2014; Cahan et al., 2015; Ernstberger 
& Grüning, 2013; Essen et al., 2013), which suggests that the impact of the 
IGQ on RDPs can be enhanced in countries with higher NGQ. Observably, the 
respective coefficient of NGQ × IGQ on the RDPI in Model 3 of Table 8 (t = 
1.80, p < .072) is positive, thus providing original evidence, which supports 
Hypothesis 3. That is, this contributes to the literature by offering new evi-
dence, which suggests that the IGQ–RDPI relationship is significantly and 
positively improved by NGQ. Thus, this result offers further evidence of the 
influence that NGQ has on the IGQ–RDPI relationship. Specifically, our evi-
dence indicates that Islamic bank managers operating in better governed coun-
tries are more likely to coercive, mimetic, and normative pressures from 
national institutions, such as accounting regulators, business and treasury min-
istries, and stock exchanges. This appears to compel Islamic bank executives to 
commit to increased risk disclosures as a way of gaining legitimacy from the 
broader society, thereby securing access to critical resources, such as finance.
Additional Analyses
We perform a number of further analyses to determine the robustness of our 
results. First, as a robustness check, we reproduce our analysis in Model 3 of 
26 Business & Society 00(0)
Table 8 by replacing our unweighted RDPI with the weighted RDPI 
(W-RDPI), and the results are presented in Model 6 of Table 8. These results 
are similar to those reported in Model 3 of Table 8, implying that our results 
seem to be robust to the use of a weighted or an unweighted disclosure index. 
Second, following extant research (Ntim et al., 2013), we address potential 
endogeneities that may be affected by omitted variable bias by estimating 
two-stage least squares using generalized panel-data estimators (G2SLS). 
First, we predict instruments by estimating a model for IGQ. Second, we 
check correlations with error terms, and then, we use the predicted values as 
instruments. Thus, in the second stage, we use the instrumented variables of 
the IGQ and rerun in Equation 1 as follows:
 RDPI IGQ NGQ CONTROLSit i it i it i it it it
i
= + + + + +
=
∑α β β β δ ε0
1
13
 ,  (2)
where in Equation 2, everything else remains unaffected as stated in Equation 
1, except that we use the instrumented part of the IGQ, and other bank-level 
governance variables. The results are presented in Model 4 of Table 8. These 
results are also similar to those reported in Model 3 of Table 8, implying that 
our results appear to be robust to potential endogeneities that may be caused 
by omitted variables bias.
Third, to ascertain the assumption underlying our fixed-panel regression 
model that all the unobserved heterogeneities may affect the correlation 
between the Islamic governance variables and the error term is invariable 
over time, we calculate a dynamic panel GMM estimator as proposed by 
Wintoki, Linck, and Netter (2012). Dynamic GMM estimators have the 
unique ability to control for a number of endogeneity problems, including 
reverse causality, unobservable firm-specific factors, dynamic endogenous 
regressors, possible omitted variables bias, heteroscedasticity, and simultane-
ity by allowing all the explanatory variables (e.g., the Islamic governance and 
all control variables) to be considered as endogenous (Ammann, Oesch, & 
Schmid, 2011; Arellano & Bond, 1991; Arellano & Bover, 1995; Wintoki 
et al., 2012). Consequently, in the dynamic GMM model, we employ Equation 
3 as follows:
 RDPI k RDPI X Zit it it it it it= + + + + +−α β γ δ ε1 1 1 ,  (3)
where RDPI is a proxy of risk management and disclosure practices level for 
bank i during year t. Xit  denotes all explanatory variables that include 
Islamic governance (IGQ), board size (BDSZ), gender diversity (GNDI), 
nonexecutive directors (NEDs), and national governance quality (NGQ). Zit  
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includes bank size (LTAS), performance (ROA), liquidity (LIQR), operations 
efficiency (CSTR), capital adequacy (CAPR), annual inflation (INFR), and 
annual GDP per capita (GDPC). δit  is the unobserved bank-year–specific 
fixed effects, and εit  is the white noise error term. The results are presented 
in Model 5 of Table 8. Again, we find the GMM results indicate a positive 
and statistically significant relation among the IGQ, NGQ, and RDPs indi-
ces. These results are also largely similar to those reported in Model 3 of 
Table 8, thereby implying that our results appear to be robust to potential 
endogeneity problems that may be caused by reverse causality, unobserv-
able firm-specific factors, dynamic endogenous regressors, possible omitted 
variables bias, heteroscedasticity, and simultaneity.
Fourth, we consider the robustness of our results to subsamples: 
Islamic banks and dual banks by rerunning Equations 1, 2, and 3, and the 
results are reported in Table 9. Apart from a few sensitivities (such as 
GNDI being now statistically significant), the results in Table 9 are simi-
lar to those reported in Table 8, thereby implying that our results seem to 
be fairly robust to the use of subsamples. Finally, Table 10 reports the 
results of the variables that influence banks to commit to greater risk dis-
closures, and how those variables work among banks operating in strongly 
governed and poorly governed environments. Table 10 reveals that IGQ 
and NGQ have a significant impact on RDPs in banks that operate in 
strongly governed environments compared with their counterparts that 
operate in countries with poorly governed national environments. 
Similarly, we found that gender diversity has a positive effect on RDPs in 
banks that operate in strongly governed environments compared with 
their counterparts operating in poorly governed countries, although this 
relationship is not statistically significant. Overall, the results support our 
hypothesis that NGQ has a moderating effect on the relationship between 
IGQ and bank risk disclosures.
Conclusion and Areas for Future Research
Although the effects of business-level factors on the level of corporate risk 
management and disclosure practices (RDPs) have been fairly documented, 
the role of religion and macro-social-level factors, such as Islamic and 
national governance quality on RDPs are rare. Therefore, this article has 
sought to make a number of new contributions to the extant literature by (a) 
examining the associations among religious governance, especially Islamic 
governance quality (IGQ), national governance quality (NGQ), and RDPs; 
and (b) consequently, ascertaining whether the link between IGQ and RDPs 
can be moderated by NGQ.
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Using one of the largest data sets to date from MENA Islamic banks over the 
2006 to 2013 period, our study reveals several interesting findings. Our results 
suggest that Islamic and national governance quality has a significant effect on 
the level of bank risk disclosures. Specifically, our results indicate that risk 
disclosures are high in banks with high IGQ and NGQ. In addition, our results 
indicate that NGQ moderates the association between IGQ and RDPs. This 
implies that banks that depict greater commitment toward incorporating Islamic 
governance into their operations through high Islamic governance index score, 
and located in better governed countries, engage in higher risk disclosures than 
those that are not. These results are consistent with the predictions of our neo-
institutional framework that incorporates both efficiency/instrumental and 
legitimation/moral views of neo-institutional theory.
This study makes a number of new contributions to the extant literature. 
First, and to the best of our knowledge, our study offers a first-time evidence on 
the effect of national governance quality on bank risk management and disclo-
sure practices using a neo-institutional framework. Second, we offer evidence 
on the impact of Islamic governance quality on bank risk management and 
disclosure practices. Finally, we provide evidence relating to the moderating 
effect of national governance quality on the relationship between Islamic gov-
ernance quality and bank risk management and disclosure practices for the first 
time. The success of our generalized neo-institutional framework in explaining 
the variations and drivers of bank risk disclosures reflects, in part, its ability to 
integrate complexity. The diverse variations of institutionalism within our 
research context make it doable to cogitate the contextual embeddedness of the 
intersections between religion and country governance, as macro-social-level 
forces operating within the context of Islamic banks.
Consequently, our results have a number of implications for regulators, 
banks, and investors, especially in emerging markets. Our results suggest that 
better governed banks at bank or national level have higher tendency to commit 
to increased level of risk disclosures. These results offer regulators extra incen-
tive to pursue internal CG reforms jointly with national-level governance 
reforms. Regarding banks, our results suggest that better Islamic governance is 
expected to be associated with better risk disclosures. These results offer share-
holders of banks additional incentive to enhance their banks’ board structure 
(e.g., board size and board independence) and pay attention to Islamic gover-
nance arrangements in particular. These results also bring to bear the impor-
tance of Islamic governance in mitigating traditional agency problems, such as 
information asymmetry, thereby enhancing bank efficiency and legitimacy 
within the broader society. Thus, our study also has practical implications. 
Specifically, banks that voluntarily incorporate prudential Islamic governance 
into their operations are more likely to be more transparent about their RDPs 
and, hence, offer new crucial insights on Islamic governance and their impact 
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on disclosure quality. Overall, our results highlight the role that religion and 
national governance, as major macrosocial forces, can play in traditional ratio-
nal business decision making, such as disclosure and transparency.
Finally, although our evidence is significant and robust, there are a num-
ber of limitations that need to be explicitly acknowledged. Such as all 
archival and quantitative studies of this nature, our governance and disclo-
sure proxies may or may not reflect actual managerial practice. In this case, 
additional insights may be offered by future studies that may employ quali-
tative approaches using, for example, interviews, case studies, and observa-
tions that may offer a more nuanced and in-depth insight regarding these 
relationships. Furthermore, researchers might investigate the impact of fur-
ther governance mechanisms (e.g., risk committee and remuneration com-
mittee) on risk disclosures, and might also be extended to the use of 
nonparametric statistical techniques, such as neural networks to test the 
robustness of their findings.
Appendix
Risk management and disclosure practice index (RDPI).
Risk type Financial risk management and disclosure practices
i. Credit  1. Exposure to credit risk and how they arise
 2. Objectives, policies, and processes for managing credit risk
 3. Method of measuring credit risk exposure
 4.  Adequate description of how credit risk management occurs, including 
providing a clear linkage between quantitative data and qualitative description
 5.  Changes in exposure to credit risk, measurement of risk, and objectives, 
policies, and processes to manage credit risk from the previous period
 6. Amount of regulatory capital for credit risk
 7.  Information about credit quality of financial assets that are not past due or 
impaired
 8. Renegotiated financial assets
 9. Aging schedule for past due amounts
10. Impairment methods and inputs disclosed
11.  Summary of quantitative data about exposure to credit risk at the reporting 
date
12. Maximum credit exposure by currency
13. Maximum credit exposure by geography
14. Maximum credit exposure by economic activity
15.  Disaggregated maximum credit risk exposure, including derivatives and off-
balance sheet items
16. Renegotiated loans for troubled borrowers
17. Risk of counterparty
18. Credit risk concentrations
19. Derivatives
20. Off-balance sheet and joint venture structures
21. Credit risk transfer/mitigation/hedging techniques
22. Collateral
23. Disclosures to help users understand credit risk
(continued)
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Risk type Financial risk management and disclosure practices
ii. Liquidity 24. Exposure to liquidity risk and how they arise
25. Objectives, policies, and processes for managing liquidity risk
26. Methods used to measure liquidity risk
27.  Changes in exposure to liquidity risk, measurement of risk, and objectives, 
policies, and processes to manage liquidity risk from the previous period
28. Contractual undiscounted cash flows
29. Maturity analysis of nonderivative liabilities
30. Maturity analysis of derivative liabilities
31.  Maturity analysis of off-balance sheet commitments and other financial 
instruments without contractually stipulated maturity
32. Maturity analysis of financial assets
33. Expected maturity analysis
34. Derivative and trading liabilities treatment
35. Liquidity risk transfer/mitigation/hedging techniques
36. Liquidity buffers sources and volume
37. Sensitivity analysis.
38. Financing facilities.
39. Counterparty concentration profile.
40. Disclosures to help users understand liquidity risk
iii. Market 41.  Objectives, policies, processes, and strategies of market risk management
42. Structure and organization of market risk management function
43. Instruments traded types
44. Interest rate risk
45. Equity risk
46. Currency risk
47. Commodities risk
48. Market risk transfer/mitigation/hedging techniques
49. Linkage with credit risk
50. Amount of regulatory capital for market risk
51. VAR
52. VAR limitations
53. Stress testing
54. Stress VAR
55. Back-testing
56. Disclosures to help users understand market risk
iv. Capital 57. Capital management
58. Capital measurement
59. Risk weighted assets
60. Tier 1
61. Tier 2
Nonfinancial risk management and disclosures practices
v. Operational 62. Amount of regulatory capital for operational risk.
63. Regulatory capital for operational risk measurement approach.
64. Operational risk management strategies and processes.
65. The operational risk management function structure and organization
66. Scope and nature of the operational risk reporting system
67. Operational risk transfer/mitigation/hedging techniques
68. Operational VAR
69. Internal audit function/internal control system
70. Key risk indicators/early warning systems
71. Self-assessment techniques
72. Stress tests/scorecard models/scenario analyses
Appendix (continued)
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Risk type Financial risk management and disclosure practices
73. Operational risk event databases
74. Legal risks
75. Additional information on risk exposure and management
76. Technology/information technology
77. Compliance
78. Marketing/customer satisfaction/boycott
79. Competition/proprietary/copyright
80. Personnel
81. Integrity/management and employee fraud
82. Business ethics/corruption
83. Disclosures to help users understand operational risk
vi. Strategic 84. Sovereign/politics
85. Performance measurement
86. Regulation
87. Taxation
88. Macroeconomic trends
89. Natural disasters/terrorism
90. GDP growth/market demand/aggregate demand
91. Intellectual property rights
92. New alliances, joint ventures, and acquisitions
93. Management of growth
94. Reputation/goodwill/image/brand name
95. Strategy
96. Disclosures to help users understand strategic risk
Total 96. Risk management and disclosure practices items
Procedure of scoring for unweighted index
 0: Risk item not disclosed by bank
 1: Risk item disclosed by bank
Procedure of scoring for weighted index
 0: Risk item not disclosed by bank
 1: Risk item disclosed by bank contains past, future, good, bad, and/or qualitative information
 2: Risk item disclosed by bank contains past, future, good, bad, qualitative and/or quantitative information
Note. VAR = value at risk.
Appendix (continued)
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Notes
1. To facilitate early reader understanding, we clarify the three main concepts (vari-
ables) that we employ in this study as follows: Islamic governance quality (IGQ) 
refers to the extent to which bank executives are willing to voluntarily incorpo-
rate Islamic values and practices into the running of their banks. We measure 
this by IGQ disclosure quality index that contains items relating to the presence 
of Islamic governance structures, such as the presence of a Shariah supervisory 
board for a bank. Bank risk management and disclosure practices (RDPs) is a 
disclosure quality index that measures the extent and quality of voluntary bank 
risk disclosures, consisting of financial, operational, and strategic risks with the 
individual risk items drawn from the Basel accords (I, II, and III), International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS; International Accounting Standards [IAS] 
32 and 39; IFRS 7 and 9), and prior studies. Finally, national governance quality 
(NGQ) refers to the World Bank’s world governance indicators developed by 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2011) and consist of six measures: (a) voice 
and accountability quality, (b) political stability quality, (c) government quality, 
(d) regulatory quality, (e) rule of law quality, and (f) control of corruption quality.
2. Islamic values consist of positive values, such as accountability, equality, ethics, 
fairness, honesty, integrity, philanthropy, responsibility, and transparency that 
are encouraged in sharp contrast to negative values, such as gambling, profi-
teering, and exploitation, that are strictly prohibited (Al-Bassam & Ntim, 2017; 
Sarker, 1999; Syed & Van Buren, 2014).
3. As a robustness check, we also employ hierarchical regression procedure that 
examines whether IGQ–RDPI relationship can be moderated by NGQ. The 
(untabulated) results indicate that NGQ is both relevant and significantly moder-
ates IGQ–RDPI relationship. This offers further empirical support to our main 
conclusions drawn from Tables 8, 9, and 10. We would like to thank an anony-
mous reviewer for this suggestion.
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